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THE TEXT OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AS A
MEASURE OF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V SMITH
AND THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
ALLAN IDES*
Congress adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993'
(RFRA) to overturn the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Employment Division v Smith.2 In Smith, the Court declined to mandate
a constitutional exemption from the State of Oregon's drug laws for two
members of the Native American Church who had ingested peyote as part
of a religious ceremony I More generally, the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause provided religiously motivated actors no special exemption
from the reach of laws of general applicability 4 Although religious beliefs
were absolutely protected by the First Amendment, religiously motivated
conduct was not. Laws of general applicability that adversely affected such
conduct were subject to neither more nor less judicial scrutiny than laws
that adversely affected conduct of a nonreligious nature.
As a consequence of Smith, a law that indirectly, although perhaps
substantially, affected a religious practice would be examined under the
lowest level of scrutiny, that is to say, virtually none at all. More intense
judicial review was reserved for those rare instances in which a law regulated
conduct because of, and not merely in spite of, that conduct's religious
nature.5 Smith did not, however, announce the complete demise of religious
exemptions from otherwise neutral laws. The Smith Court made clear that
its holding did not preclude a legislature from creating an exemption for a
religious practice; the Court did hold, however, that such exemptions were
not constitutionally required.6
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. This Essay is dedicated to the
students in my constitutional law seminar, Fall '93: Stephen Buhr, Cecelia Davis-Deane, Chip
Ford, Roberta Green, Brian Greene, Patricia Hale, Tom Kleine, John Lemmon, David Littel,
Yolanda Long, Mark Maloney, Gemenne Mongno, Michael Poll, Jacqueline Stroh, and Jean
Taylor.
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C.).
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
4. Id. at 478-79.
5. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993) (holding that law resulted from efforts to eliminate specific religious conduct).
6. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). After the decision in Smith,
the State of Oregon adopted legislation that exempted members of the Native American Church
from the laws proscribing the use of peyote. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1991). Many other
states also recognize an exemption. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B)(1)-(3) (1992);
COLO. REV STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4116(8) (1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 453.541 (1991).
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The response to the Smith decision was intense and highly negative.7
And although some of that intensity may have been attributable to what
was perceived as the Court's insensitivity to a minority religion, the critique
of Smith transcended the specific facts of the case. The trouble with Smith,
according to its critics, was the doctrine it created, or, perhaps more to the
point, the doctrine it destroyed. Prior to Smith, and most notably in Sherbert
v. Verner8 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,9 the Court had, at least under some
circumstances, applied a compelling state interest test to laws of general
applicability that either indirectly affected or more directly burdened reli-
giously motivated conduct.
Thus in Sherbert, a Sabbatarian was entitled to receive unemployment
benefits even though her unemployment resulted only from her refusal to
work on Saturdays as required of all other citizens; the otherwise neutral
unemployment law substantially and unlawfully burdened the practice of
her chosen religion. 10 Similarly, in Yoder, Amish parents were granted a
special privilege to withdraw their children from school after the completion
of the eighth grade since, according to the Amish, further education would
undermine the religious values and salvation of the Amish community.,
Although the Smith opinion rather inartfully fudged the point, in essence,
the Smith Court jettisoned the reasoning and doctrine of Sherbert and
Yoder. No longer would courts use the compelling state interest test to
examine the constitutionality of a law of general applicability under the
Free Exercise Clause, regardless of that law's impact on religious practices.'
2
The RFRA was expressly designed to return free exercise claims to their
perceived legal status prior to Smith,'3 that is, to affirm the doctrinal
7. Citations to the critical literature are noted in James E. Ryan, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. Rav. 1407, 1409
n.15 (1992). See also Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Religion Clause: A Double Guarantee of
Religious Liberty, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 189; Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 221; John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?,
42 DEPAuL L. Rav. 567 (1992); Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Rehnquist Court's Free Exercise
Collision on the Peyote Road, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 315 (1993). For dissenting views, see Gerard
V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HoFsTRA
L. REV. 245 (1991); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. Cm. L. REv. 308 (1991); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REv. 117.
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
11. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972).
12. The Court left open the possibility that the compelling state interest test would
continue to be applied to unemployment compensation laws. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990).
13. The RFRA provides:
The purposes of this Act are to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
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legitimacy of Sherbert and Yoder, and, as RFRA's proponents would have
it, to return religious liberty to the United States.' 4 To this end, section 3
of the RFRA provides that the government-broadly defined to cover all
agencies of federal, state and local government-"shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability."'" In short, the RFRA creates a blanket, generic
religious exemption. The only exception, which parallels the doctrinal juris-
prudence of Sherbert and Yoder, states: "[glovernment may substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person-(l) is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."' 
6
Of course, the two key assumptions of the RFRA are that Smith was
wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law-indeed, obviously and
tragically wrong might be a more apropos description-and that a legislative
reassertion of past doctrine and the accompanying doctrinal tests will provide
a proper and effective cure for the Court's flawed interpretation of the
Constitution. The latter assumption strikes me as founded upon a somewhat
naive and unreal vision of the meaning, effectiveness, and function of
doctrine, but I will not dwell on that point. 7 I am more curious about the
first assumption, namely, that Smith was wrongly decided. I am not sure
what it means when one says that Smith was wrongly decided. Wrong under
what standard? I am sure that the critics of Smith assume that the Warren
and Burger Court interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause were somehow
correct or better, though I think "familiar" would be a more fitting term.
Indeed, Smith is undoubtedly quite inconsistent with the Warren and Burger
Court decisions, Justice Scalia's protestations to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. 8 But by what measure is the decision wrong as opposed to merely
reflecting a different policy judgment about the scope of the protection
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause? Similarly, by what measure does the
RFRA represent a correct or incorrect interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause?
One possible measure to both questions is the language of the Free
Exercise Clause. What does that language reveal to us? Or better yet, what
exercise is substantially burdened by government.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 § 2(b)(1),
(2) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
14. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1992) (statement of
Nadine Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)); Douglas Laycock,
Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841, 855
(1992).
15. § 3(a), 107 Stat. at 1488.
16. Id. § 3(b)(1), (2) at 1488-89.
17. For a similar critique of RFRA, see generally Ryan, supra note 7.
18. Justice Scalia attempted to distinguish prior, inconsistent cases. See Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-84 (1990).
1994]
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would it have meant to an eighteenth century reader? It would seem-at
least if one assumes some relevance to the constitutional text-that a close
examination of the text would be appropriate and perhaps even somewhat
enlightening. In any event, this Essay will pursue that inquiry as an attempt
to see which interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Smith version
or the RFRA version, most closely resembles any meanings that can be
discovered in the text.
The text of the First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' 19 In the present context, the focus is on the latter phrase, the so-
called Free Exercise Clause. Thus, "Congress shall make no law prohibiting
the free exercise of religion." In briefly pursuing this examination of text,
and in particular the last six words of the text, I will proceed from the
fictional perspective of a reasonably literate and informed lay reader of the
eighteenth century (created, of course, by a reasonably literate and informed
professional reader of the twentieth century). My reader is also curious,
open-minded and blessed with a perspicacity somewhat more intense than
the casual word browser. The basic goal is to consider those possible
interpretations our fictional reader might assign to the Free Exercise Clause.
Of course, we cannot expect to know with certainty which meanings will
be assigned by our reader. With any luck, however, we should achieve a
fair approximation of the possibilities. For reasons that should become
apparent, I will take the words in reverse order.
RELIGION
We begin with the word "religion." What is religion? Just to ask the
question hints at the complexity and potential futility of the inquiry. This
question has and continues to perplex philosophers, theologians, and legal
scholars. But it need not perplex us, nor would it perplex our reader. Before
succumbing to a potential cascade of philosophic, theologic, and jurispru-
dential possibilities, let us consider a simpler approach. What, in common
parlance, would be understood by the use of the word "religion" in the
Bill of Rights? After all, the Bill of Rights was not designed as a preface
to philosophic, theologic, or even jurisprudential inquiries. It was the
product of pragmatic and political judgment, meant to be read, used, and
presumably understood by a broad spectrum of people, including such
persons as our reader.
Doctor Samuel Johnson's dictionary of the English language-a dic-
tionary familiar to readers of the late eighteenth century-provides two
definitions of religion: "1. Virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and
expectation of future rewards and punishments .... 2. A system of divine
faith and worship as opposite to others."' 2 The examples given under the
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. SAMUL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755 ed. reprinted in
1979).
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first definition draw a distinction between duty toward men and duty toward
God. Only the latter is properly considered religion. Thus, "[rieligion or
virtue, in a large sense, includes duty to God and our neighbour; but in a
proper sense, virtue signifies duty towards men, and religion duty to God."',
The second definition refers to specific systems of belief and worship,
defining what we would now refer to as religious sects, as in the Catholic
religion or the Jewish religion. Taken together, according to Doctor John-
son, religion has a behavioral aspect connoting virtuous duty to God or the
divine, and an organizational aspect describing specific systems of divine
belief and worship.
The definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), although
somewhat more complex, appear to cover the same basic spectrum of ideas
found in Doctor Johnson's dictionary. Thus, the OED defines religion as
"a particular system of faith and worship" and as "recognition on the part
of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and
as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental
and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect
upon the individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of
this feeling as a standard of spiritual and practical life.'"' Another definition
indicates a somewhat secular usage-"devotion to some principle; strict
fidelity or faithfulness; conscientiousness; pious affection or attachment."
' 3
This secular usage, however, seems to derive its force and meaning by
suggesting an analogy to spiritual practices and beliefs: "An old Word is
retain'd by an Antiquary with as much Religion as a Relick.
' 2 4
Webster's Third New International Dictionary-bringing us well into
the twentieth century-provides several usages, most of which roughly
parallel Doctor Johnson's definitions:
[T]he personal commitment to and serving of God or a god with
worshipful devotion, conduct in accord with divine commands esp.
as found in accepted sacred writings or declared by authoritative
teachers, a way of life recognized as incumbent on true believers,
and typically the relating of oneself to an organized body of believers
.. the state of a religious ... one of the systems of faith and
worship ... the body of institutionalized expressions of sacred
beliefs, observances, and social practices found within a given
cultural context ... the profession or practice of religious beliefs
... religious observances . .. a personal awareness or conviction
of the existence of a supreme being or of supernatural powers or
influences controlling one's own, humanity's, or all nature's destiny
... the access of such an awareness or conviction accompanied by
21. Id.




WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:135
or arousing reverence, gratitude, humility, the will to obey an serve
.. religious experience or insight. 2
Two definitions in Webster's have a more secular tone: "[S]crupulous
conformity [to] ... a cause, principle, or system of tenets held with ardor,
devotion, conscientiousness, and faith ... a value held to be of supreme
importance.''26 But again, used in this context the word "religion" seems
not to be used as a separate construct but as a creative analogy to the
spiritual order, as in, "Baseball was his religion."
In sum, in both the eighteenth century and in modern contexts, the
word "religion" conveys two possible meanings relating to the divine or
spiritual. The first describing a way of life inspired by the divine and the
second describing an organized system of beliefs and practices similarly
inspired. A third possible usage is the secular meaning suggested by both
the OED and Webster's, namely, religion as any system of deeply held
values. This third usage is not irrelevant from a modern perspective.
Certainly arguments have been made that secular moral beliefs are entitled
to the same constitutional respect granted divinely inspired beliefs. Indeed,
this is one of the important questions implicitly posed by the Smith decision
as well as the Sherbert and Yoder line of cases. Would our reader have
understood the word "religion" to convey this secular meaning in the
context of the Bill of Rights? I think not.
In the first place, the secular usage reflects a more creative spin on the
idea of religion than it does a separate construct. A person who holds
secular ideas firmly may be said to hold them with a religious fervor;
indeed, those ideas may even be called that person's religion; but it does
not follow that we would view that person's ideas as a religion in the
commonly used sense of the word. We simply mean to establish a strong
analogy. Similarly, a committed Marxist may share certain traits with a
religious zealot, but only by way of analogy is the Marxist referred to as
religious.
Next, the actual placement of the word "religion" in the First Amend-
ment is in the phrase "law respecting an establishment of religion." Without
fully .pursuing a liiguistic study of the Establishment Clause, it seems quite
likely that the use of the word "religion" within that phrase was not meant
in the secular sense, but in the divine sense, in other words, as pertaining
to divinely inspired institutions. Most importantly, the word "establishment"
was commonly used to refer to state-supported religious institutions of the
divinely inspired sort. An eighteenth century reader would have readily
picked up on that meaning, and would not have been confused by any
potential secular usage, analogous, philosophic, or otherwise.
If this brief assessment of the "establishment of religion" is correct,
and my reader and I are both confident it is, one would think that the
25. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1918 (1986).
26. Id.
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subsequent phrase "the free exercise thereof" would refer to the same type
of usage, namely, religion as divinely inspired. At least I expect that is
what a reader of the phrase would likely infer from the juxtaposition of
the establishment and free exercise clauses, if not simply from the common
usage of the word religion as relating to divinely inspired beliefs, practices,
and organizations. In short, our reader would most likely understand the
word religion to encompass the two definitions provided by Doctor Johnson.
EXERCISE OF RELIGION
How then would our reader interpret the phrase "exercise of religion?"
Doctor Johnson provides nine definitions for the noun exercise:
1. Labour of the body; labour considered as conducive to the cure
or prevention of diseases .... 2. Something done for amuse-
ment .... 3. Habitual action by which the body is formed to
gracefulness, air and agility.... 4. Preparatory practice in order
to skill: as, the exercise of soldiers .... 5. Use; actual application
of any thing. . . . 6. Practice; outward performance .... 7. Em-
ployment .... 8. Talk; that which one is appointed to perform....
9. Act of divine worship whether publick or private. 27
Conjoined with religion, definitions one through four, as well as definition
eight, do not seem to work in any sensible fashion within the phrase
"exercise of religion." Definition five is a possibility, though the phrase
"use of religion" seems somewhat peculiar and more than slightly ambig-
uous. Definition six, which renders "the practice or outward performance
of religion," seems closer to the mark. If this is the meaning our reader
assigns, then the exercise of religion could be seen as the outward perform-
ance of duties derived from one's religion. A Quaker's refusal to fight
might, therefore, be an exercise of religion within this definition. The ninth
definition directly refers to divine worship and would seem particularly apt.
If this is our reader's definition of exercise, then clearly the exercise of
religion refers to acts of divine worship inspired by one's religion. One
immediately thinks of church services, hymns, prayers, and, of course, the
ingestion of peyote.
The OED definitions include the general connotations-"the habitual
carrying out (of any particular kind of conduct)"28-as well as the explicitly
religious:
The practice or performance of rites and ceremonies, worship, etc.;
the right or permission to celebrate the observances (of a relig-
ion) .... A religious observance .... An act of public worship ....
An act of preaching or prophesying; a discourse .... The discussion
27. JOHNSON, supra note 20.
28. 3 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 401 (1970).
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of a passage of Scripture; a meeting of the Presbytery for holding
such a discussion.
29
Webster's is in full accord.3 0
Given the foregoing, it would seem that the exercise of religion surely
includes ritual acts of divine worship such as praying or the performance
of religious ceremonies. This is true regardless of whether our reader adopts
the general definition of exercise (practice, performance, conduct, and so
forth) or the specifically religious usage (performance of religious ceremonies
or rites, acts of worship, acts of observance). The more general definition
embraces the specific religious usage when used in conjunction with the
prepositional phrase "of religion." An act of worship, for example, is a
practice (or exercise) of religion. And, of course, the specifically religious
definitions of exercise expressly refer to acts of worship, the performance
of religious ceremonies, and so forth.
That is not to say that a choice between the general and specific
definitions of exercise makes no difference. One could argue that the
specifically religious connotations of the word exercise, referring to acts of
worship or the performance of religious ceremonies, ought to trump the
more general usage of the word. The assumption is that there is another
category of religiously motivated conduct that we would not characterize as
either worship or ritual. Thus recital of the Lord's Prayer would be an
exercise of religion, but an act of benevolence motivated by one's belief in
the divinely imposed obligations of Christian charity might not. Similarly,
the ritual use of peyote would be an exercise of religion (as in Smith), but
a parent's refusal to send a child to school beyond the eighth grade would
not (as in Yoder)-a direct reversal of what the Court actually did.
The question is, would our eighteenth century reader have drawn such
a distinction? It is certainly possible that the phrase "exercise of religion"
had, by the late eighteenth century, developed a precise usage that referred
only to acts of worship and ceremony. Even if that usage was not exclusive,
it was certainly common; the numerous pre-nineteenth century examples in
the OED suggest as much.3 ' On the other hand, the distinction drawn
between acts of worship and other religiously motivated conduct may not
be a distinction that our reader would even contemplate. If our reader were
a religious person, for example, he or she might assume that all conduct
taken in accord with the will of God is a form of worship and, hence, the
exercise of one's religion. To lead a Christian life would be, therefore, a
29. Id. at 401-02.
30. WEBSTER'S THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DiCTONARY 795 (1986).
31. Some writers have suggested that the phrase "free exercise of religion'! was used
interchangeably with the phrase "rights of conscience," both of which merely stood for the
general concept of freedom of religion. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114-19 (1990). From a reader's perspective,
this insight only leads to a further abstraction. What is freedom of religion and to what extent
does that freedom include the right to practice one's religion? This question takes us back to
the text as written.
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form of worship. Certainly the language permits this construction. Similarly,
I expect a Quaker would see the refusal to bear arms as a form of worship.
In addition, some of the "religious" usages of the word exercise do not fit
precisely into the worship mode: preaching, prophesying, discussing scrip-
ture.
Of course, without more information it is not possible to know which
definition our reader would adopt, at least not when the phrase is stated
in the abstract. In fact, it is difficult to make an educated guess at this
point. From our reader's perspective, the phrase "exercise of religion" may
refer only to acts of worship, ceremony, and the like-at least what those
terms were commonly understood to signify-or it may refer more generally
to all conduct taken in accord with the principles of a religion. Most likely
our reader would not have agonized over these words, but would have read
them as referring generally to the practice of religion, without parsing
through the possibilities of what that meant. We are left with a significant
ambiguity to which we will return.
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
I will not dwell on the adjective "free." Although Doctor Johnson
provides several definitions, the one most sensibly apropos is the second:
"Uncompelled; unrestrained. ' 3 2 This is certainly the usage with which we
have become familiar and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is
probably safe to assume that our eighteenth century reader would have
assigned this or a similar meaning to the word, at least as used within the
context of the Bill of Rights. The OED and Webster's provide no contrary
suggestions. Despite the potential libertarian breadth of this usage, I would
not lightly assume that the word "free" connotes an absolute license. A
better assumption, taken from our reader's perspective, would be that
freedom within a civil society is inherently limited by the mutual freedom
and safety of one's fellow citizens.
With the foregoing understanding and adding the word "free" to the
results of the previous discussion, it would seem that the "free exercise of
religion" can be fairly translated as either uncompelled and unrestrained
worship of the divine or as uncompelled and unrestrained conduct motivated
by divinely inspired beliefs, both within the context of the legitimate
standards of a civil society.
PROHIBITING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
This brings us to the word "prohibiting." How would our reader
interpret the word "prohibiting," within the phrase "prohibiting the free
exercise of religion?" The word "prohibit" has two somewhat different
usages, both of which are at least potentially relevant to the constitutional
text and each of which could send the proscription of that text in slightly
32. JOHNSON, supra note 20.
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different directions. According to Doctor Johnson, the word prohibit means:
"1. To forbid; to interdict by authority. ... 2. To debar; to hinder."33
The first definition suggests an exercise of authority to preclude the doing
of a certain thing, as in "the law prohibits speeds in excess of sixty-five
miles per hour." The second definition suggests physical impossibility, as
in "the fire prohibited our attempts at rescue." The OED confirms these
understandings by providing parallel, but slightly more specific definitions:
"1. To forbid (an action or thing) by or as a command or statute; to
interdict.... 2. To prevent, preclude, hinder, or debar (an action or thing)
by physical means .... -14 Webster's is in full accord.
35
The language that precedes the word "prohibiting," "Congress shall
make no law," illuminates the likely choice our reader would make between
the two possible definitions of that word. Without analyzing this phrase
word by word, it seems reasonably clear that these words expressly preclude
the federal legislature from exercising its legislative authority in some manner
later to be described in the sentence. The first definition of prohibit is
premised on the concept of an authority to command, and legislative action
in the form of a statute that precludes particular conduct is a prime example
of such a prohibition. A legally binding provision that states, "Congress
shall make no law prohibiting," takes from Congress the authority to
command in the specified area. If the subsequent language stated, "speeds
in excess of sixty-five miles per hour," we would assume that Congress
could not pass legislation making such speeds unlawful. Thus, the first
definition of prohibit seems precisely tailored to the design of the First
Amendment as a limit on the authority to command through legislation.
Congress may not prohibit the specified acts through the exercise of legis-
lative authority. Assuming our reader understood the Bill of Rights to
involve limits on governmental authority, it seems quite likely that he or
she would interpret the word "prohibiting" in a manner consistent with the
first usage.
The likelihood that our reader would adopt the first definition of
prohibit is bolstered by further consideration of the second definition. Under
that definition, the word "prohibit" is synonymous with "prevent" or
"hinder," often in the sense of a physical obstruction. One could say, "The
weather prohibited (prevented) the contractor from completing the construc-
33. Id.
34. 8 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1441 (1970). The OED provides a third definition:
"To forbid, stop, or prevent (a person) ... from doing something ... ." Id. However, that
definition appears to be nothing more than a variation of the first definition with a focus of
the prohibition on a person rather than on an action or thing. The examples given under each
definition bear this out. Under the first definition: "In England an act of parliament was
passed in the 5th year of reign of Henry IV prohibiting the attempts at transmutation and
making them felonious." Id. Under the third definition: "There is no Act ... prohibiting the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from being in the pay of continental powers." Id. at
1442.
35. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1813 (1986).
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tion." Or one could say, "The high price of the goods prohibited their
sale." In these examples, prohibit is not used in the sense of a command,
but in the sense of an obstacle. If we attempt to put a human face behind
such a prohibition, we might say, "Jean's attitude prohibited further dis-
cussion." By so saying, we would not mean that Jean had directly forbidden
further discussion-at least the foregoing quote would be a rather inartful
way of stating that proposition; rather, we would most likely mean that
Jean's attitude made further discussion pointless. Her attitude indirectly
ended the conversation. On the other, hand, if we insert Congress into any
of the foregoing examples, a very different meaning emerges: "Congress
prohibited the contractor from completing the construction," or "Congress
prohibited the sale of those goods," or "Congress prohibited further dis-
cussion." In each of the revised examples, the sense of direct command is
reinserted, reinforcing the importance of the context in which the word
"prohibit" is being used. I strongly suspect our reader would have appre-
ciated that context and would have proceeded under the assumption that
the word "prohibiting" so used conveyed a sense of a direct, authoritarian
command.
3 6
In the context of our complete sentence, "Congress shall make no law
prohibiting the free exercise of religion," this means at a minimum that the
federal legislature is without power to forbid divinely inspired worship
(prayers, religious practices) and perhaps other religiously motivated con-
duct. Congress could be said to forbid (or prohibit) such practices when
the command of the law is directed at the religiously motivated practice, as
in "Religious worship on Saturday is forbidden." On the other hand, a
Sunday closing law that did not preclude Saturday worship, but only made
Saturday worship more difficult (perhaps even substantially so) would not
be covered within the proscription and hence would not be a law prohibiting
the exercise of religion. Although Congress may have adversely affected a
religious practice, it did not prohibit that practice, at least not in the sense
of the first definition of prohibit.
A slightly different question is presented by a law that forbids the
taking of specified action that under some circumstances may be religious
in nature, such as a neutral law prohibiting the consumption of wine. Does
such a law prohibit the free exercise of religion? A law making the
consumption of wine illegal clearly prohibits the consumption of wine; it
forbids that consumption. Assuming no exceptions to that proscription, the
law would also forbid the consumption of wine as part of a religious
exercise, even though the law was not directed at suppression of a religious
practice. Thus, although the intent of the law may not have been to suppress
a religious practice, the law does forbid, in other words, prohibit, something
that is a religious practice. To reach a contrary conclusion, one would have
36. I realize that by rejecting the second definition of "prohibition" I have implicitly
suggested that modern cases such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), are atextual; I
will return to this point in the concluding section.
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to say that the law does not forbid the consumption of wine at religious
ceremonies, but, of course, given the defined scope of the law, that is
simply not true. These observations suggest that although our reader may
not interpret "prohibit" broadly to include all action with an hdverse impact
upon a religious practice, he or she will not necessarily read "prohibit"
narrowly to exclude laws of general applicability that happen to include a
religious practice within their proscription.
There is an argument against this slightly more expansive reading of
the word prohibit. Congress is precluded from prohibiting "the" free
exercise of religion, not all exercises of religion; and although the con-
sumption of wine is sometimes "an" exercise of religion, it does not
necessarily follow that a law forbidding the consumption of wine generally
is a law that prohibits "the" free exercise of religion. The answer depends
on whether one considers the phrase "free exercise of religion" as designed
to insulate a catalogue of protected activities from congressional attention,
namely, all religious practices, or as descriptive of a concept that embraces
a general notion of religious toleration precluding Congress from consciously
interfering with religious practices. In other words, could the direction of
the entire proscription against congressional action be toward eliminating
only those laws that particularly focused on religious practices? It is, after
all, "the free exercise of religion" that Congress is precluded from prohib-
iting. In this sense, a law that prohibited the free exercise of religion would
be one that directly outlawed certain conduct because of, and not merely
in spite of, that conduct's religious nature. This more focused reading of
the word "prohibiting" would, of course, be consistent with the patterns
of religious intoleration with which our reader would have been most
familiar, namely, direct and intentional acts of interference with religious
practices. Of course, the mere existence of this potential reading does little
to establish the choice our reader would make.
My suspicion is that our reader would not likely think about the
distinction drawn between laws that specifically prohibit religious practices
and laws that generally prohibit a practice that for some persons happens
to be religious. Given the historical milieu, our reader would surely read
the sentence as necessarily referring to the first sort of prohibition, but
would not then make any judgment about the slightly more expansive
possibilities for the word. If queried about those possibilities, our reader,
being an intelligent person, would probably say, "Interesting. Could that
be what they meant?" If potential examples were considered, our reader's
answer might vary according to those examples. Again we are left with an
ambiguity. Although "prohibit" would likely be understood in the command
sense, there is no obvious answer as to the scope of the command that is
being precluded from the congressional arsenal of authority. Is the scope
of that proscription premised on the "because of" or the "in spite of"
interpretation of the word prohibit? Neither we nor our reader can be
certain, at least not without more than is provided by the bare text.
37
37. See McConnell, supra note 31, at 1114-16. Professor McConnell comments on the
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FOUR ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
We have uncovered at least two ambiguities that could have reasonably
crept into our reader's attempt to discover meaning in the text of the Free
Exercise Clause. The word "prohibiting" can be read broadly to proscribe
laws that forbid conduct that happens to be of a religious nature, 3 or
narrowly to include only those laws that forbid conduct because of that
conduct's religious nature. Similarly, the phrase "free exercise of religion"
can be read broadly to include all religiously motivated conduct, or more
narrowly to include only what would be commonly understood to be acts
of worship or the like. Applying rules of mathematical probability, these
two ambiguities render four possible interpretive combinations:3 9





Of course, each of these interpretive combinations is preceded by the phrase,
"Congress shall make no law." Understanding how that phrase interacts
with each combination may bring us slightly closer to our reader's inter-
pretation or at least give us a clearer idea of the interpretive possibilities.
two potential meanings of the word "prohibit." McConnell suggests that one ought to presume,
in the absence of contrary evidence, that the broader interpretation of the word ought to
prevail: "While we cannot rule out the possibility that the term 'prohibiting' might impliedly
be limited to laws that prohibit the exercise of religion in a particular way-that is, in a
discriminatory fashion-we should at least begin with the presumption that the words carry
as broad a meaning as their natural usage." Id. I am not sure what it means to refer to a
word's natural usage, and the phrase becomes especially unclear when the word has more than
one use, as does the word "prohibit." I would think that one should attempt to find meaning
by examining the context in which the word is being used and by then assessing how the
potential usages of the word function within that context.
Professor McConnell also argues that state-court decisions construing state constitutional
provisions in the years surrounding the adoption of the Bill of Rights establish, in essence,
the broader reading of the word "prohibiting." Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990). Professor Gerard
Bradley, however, has provided a powerful rejoinder to McConnell's conclusions. Bradley,
supra note 7, at 261-307.
38. I assume for present purposes that Congress could avoid this broad proscription by
exempting religious practices from the coverage of any particular law.
39. Of course, if there are more ambiguities, there are more possibilities. For example,
if the definition of prohibit as prevent or hinder were used, the interpretive combinations
would increase to six (three definitions of prohibit multiplied by two definitions of exercise of
religion). Similarly, if we accept the definition of religion that includes secular beliefs our
interpretive combinations would be further increased to twelve (three definitions of prohibit
multiplied by two definitions of exercise multiplied by two definitions of religion). I think,
however, for reasons already explained, the combinations described in the text represent the
most likely potential readings of the text.
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A Broad/Broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause precludes
Congress from making any law that proscribes religiously motivated conduct,
regardless of whether Congress is aware of the potential religious nature of
that conduct and regardless of how one characterizes that conduct (worship
or otherwise). Under this interpretation, Congress would, therefore, be
required to exempt religiously motivated conduct from the reach of laws of
general applicability. At first blush, the Broad/Broad interpretation might
seem to lead to absurd results. Thus, if we take the proscription literally,
a law outlawing murder in the territories could not be applied to a religiously
motivated murder. Although the law prohibited murder only as a general
category, it in effect prohibits murder as a religious exercise, that is, as
conduct motivated by religious beliefs. But this speculative possibility ignores
the limits implicit in the adjective "free." If, as was suggested earlier, the
word free does not connote absolute license, but implicitly includes the basic
standards of a civil society such as public safety and health, in other words,
if free exercise of religion means freedom of religion within the standards
of a civil society, then the Broad/Broad reading would not serve as a
vehicle for absurd results. It would, however, require Congress -to provide
exemptions for religious activity when that activity does not violate the
standards of a civil society. One can readily see how the compelling state
interest test could be used as a measure of those standards.
A Broad/Narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause includes the same
expansive reading of the word "prohibiting" as does the prior category,
but that interpretation is coupled with a more circumspect reading of the
phrase "exercise of religion" as including only conduct in the nature of
worship. Thus Congress may not either directly or through a law of general
applicability forbid any activity that happens to qualify as an act of worship.
Again potential absurd results-the protection of ritual human sacrifice-
are avoided by a sensible reference to the adjective "free."
The Broad/Narrow reading does, however, raise two difficulties. The
first is the difficulty of distinguishing between religious worship and some
other category of religiously motivated conduct. This problem has been
alluded to earlier, and the text of the Free Exercise Clause provides no clue
as to how one would draw the necessary distinctions. Next, the Broad/
Narrow reading permits Congress to proscribe religiously motivated conduct
that cannot be fairly characterized as worship, assuming such a category
exists, and Congress could accomplish this through laws of general appli-
cability that happened to include religious activity (for example, no exemp-
tions from a military draft for conscientious objectors, some of whom may
object to war on religious grounds) or through laws specifically directed at
the religious conduct (for example, no exemptions from a military draft for
persons who claim religious scruples against war). In this manner the Broad/
Narrow reading seems to cut against the concept of freedom of religion as
a form of religious toleration by permitting Congress to base its treatment
of an individual on that individual's religious motivations and beliefs so
long as Congress does not regulate the manner in which that individual
worships.
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A Narrow/Narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause provides an
interpretation under which Congress is precluded only from making those
laws intentionally directed at the suppression of acts of religious worship
and the like. Thus Congress could not, consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause, create a law that specifically proscribed the drinking of wine as
part of a religious ceremony; Congress could, however, pass a law that
proscribed the drinking of wine generally, and that law could be lawfully
applied to the drinking of wine at a religious ceremony. Also, just as with
the Broad/Narrow interpretation, under the Narrow/Narrow interpretation,
Congress could pass a law that directly regulated religious conduct not
falling into the category of worship. Again, the tension with the concept
of freedom of religion is evident.
Finally, a Narrow/Broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause would
preclude Congress from directly proscribing any activity falling within the
general description of religiously motivated conduct. In other words, Con-
gress could never use one's religious motivation for conduct as the basis
for proscribing that conduct. Since the phrase "free exercise of religion" is
being interpreted broadly, no distinction would be drawn between worship
and other religiously motivated conduct. Congress would simply be pre-
cluded from using religion as a basis for proscribing whatever conduct was
being addressed. Congress could, however, pass laws of general applicability
that happened to include within their ambit some religious practices.
Of course, we cannot know for certain which of the four potential
interpretations our eighteenth century reader would select. Indeed, we do
not even know if our reader would be pressed to make any selection among
the four; rather, our reader might take from the Free Exercise Clause a
somewhat ambiguous understanding of the text, with little concern for the
precise scope of either the word "prohibiting" or the phrase "free exercise
of religion." In the absence of a specific factual context, our reader might
perceive no pressure to dig for a more precise meaning. It may be sufficient
that a commitment to freedom of religion has been stated. Indeed, one of
the primary problems with reading a legal text is that it has no concrete
meaning until it is applied in a specific factual context, and at that point
its meaning is revealed only as a consequence of particular facts and policies.
But let us assume that our reader is sufficiently curious about the text to
search for a more precise meaning. Do our four interpretive combinations
bring us any closer to our reader's potential interpretation?
There is an interpretive problem that infects both the Broad/Narrow
and the Narrow/Narrow combinations. The interpretation of "exercise of
religion" as pertaining only to acts of worship and the like seems plausible
when the phrase is examined outside the sentence in which it is used. But
such an examination looks at words in a relative vacuum. Although "exercise
of religion" can mean acts of worship and may often refer to acts of
worship in common parlance, its meaning is not necessarily so limited when
placed in a sentence that gives the phrase a more particular context and
direction. The Free Exercise Clause provides just such a defining context.
A general reading of the Free Exercise Clause, that is, a reading that does
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not carefully parse the clause word by word, certainly suggests that the
overall gist of the text is to deny the authority of Congress to interfere with
the freedom of religion. As a consequence, a specific interpretation of one
component of the clause that runs counter to this general meaning would
seem anomalous in the absence of some indication that the component was
designed to counter the overall tendency of the sentence. I see nothing in
the language of the Free Exercise Clause indicating such a design; and the
narrow interpretation of "exercise of religion" does run counter to the
general concept of freedom of religion by permitting Congress an authority
to use religion as a basis for legal proscription. Thus when the phrase
"exercise of religion" is considered within the Free Exercise Clause, the
narrow interpretation of that phrase remains a technical possibility but a
relatively improbable one. Our reader, being literate and careful (not to
mention dependent on my judgment), would likely come to a similar
conclusion, thereby interpreting the phrase "exercise of religion" as includ-
ing a wide array of religiously motivated activities, limited only by the
legitimate standards of a civil society.
This leaves us with two interpretive combinations (Broad/Broad and
Narrow/Broad). Under both combinations, the broadest scope is given to
the phrase "exercise of religion." The controversy is over the scope of the
word "prohibiting." I think our reader would assume, at least on first
reading, that a law prohibiting the free exercise of religion was a law directly
forbidding a specific religious practice or directed at outlawing a particular
religious sect. I have two reasons for this conclusion. The historical frame-
work within which our reader's perceptions were formed was one in which
religious persecution was generally accomplished through specific acts di-
rected at religious practices or disfavored religious groups. The Pilgrims
came to the new world to flee religious persecution, and so forth, and so
on. The words of the clause conjure this obvious history, and without
further speculation the image of direct persecution remains dominant.
Second, in a relatively unregulated society with a relatively homogeneous
religious culture, the possibility that laws of general applicability might
burden religious practices was relatively remote and not likely to occur to
our reader.
On the other hand, if pressed on the point by a consideration of
hypothetical possibilities under laws of general application, such as laws of
conscription as they affected Quakers, our reader might well shrug his or
her shoulders and say, "Yes, perhaps the language requires Congress to
exempt religious practices from the scope of laws of general applicability."
As previously suggested, the word "prohibiting" can easily carry this
interpretive weight without contorting the sense of the other words in the
Free Exercise Clause. A law prohibiting the consumption of wine also
prohibits the consumption of wine as part of a religious observance.
In short, I conclude that a fair case can be made for either the Broad/
Broad or the Narrow/Broad readings of the Free Exercise Clause. I do not
think that a convincing case can be made for either the Broad/Narrow or
the Narrow/Narrow interpretations. Of course, my conclusions are at best
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educated guesses as to what a fictional reader would conclude-conclusions
tainted by my twentieth century perceptions. Assuming these conclusions
have an air of reasonableness, the next step is to measure the decision in
Employment Division v. Smith and the RFRA against the backdrop of the
two plausible interpretive combinations.
SMITH, Ti RFRA AND TEXT
The Smith Court's exposition of the Free Exercise Clause begins with
the observation, "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.'
'4
In stating this proposition, the Court does not rely upon any particular
reading of the text; rather, the Court extrapolates this proposition from
modern case law. How the right to believe and profess becomes "first and
foremost" in a clause that seems to create protection for the practice of
religion is unexplained. Having established this hierarchy, however, it is
easier for the Court to place the practice of religion on a somewhat lesser
plane. Thus, according to the Court, "It would be true, we think (though
no case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be 'prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions
only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the
religious belief that they display." 4' After this grudging recognition of a
protected sphere for religious practices, the Court rejects the proposition
that the Free Exercise Clause applies as well to laws of general applicability.
In the Court's words, "As a textual matter, we do not think the words
must be given that meaning." ' 4 The Court then proceeds to demonstrate
that case law supports the narrower interpretation of "prohibiting" as "the
correct one."1
43
Other writers have established that the Court's exposition of the case
law was seriously flawed, especially in light of the Sherbert and Yoder
decisions.44 I agree, that is, assuming one accepts Sherbert and Yoder as
describing the appropriate base line. From that base line, the doctrinal
discussion in Smith is more of a fabrication than an elucidation; of course,
if one is adverse to judicial fabrication, Sherbert and Yoder would be neck
and neck with Smith for high honors. My interest here, however, is not
doctrinal purity or judicial dexterity, but the relationship between Smith
and the text of the Free Exercise Clause. On that score, the Smith decision
appears to have adopted a plausible interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, namely, the Narrow/Broad interpretation in which the word "pro-
hibiting" is interpreted as a command directed at specified conduct. Under
this interpretation, a law that prohibits the consumption of wine is not
40. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 878.
43. Id.
44. See generally McConnell, supra note 31.
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automatically deemed a law that prohibits the free exercise of religion merely
because the consumption of wine happens to be a religious practice. Notice,
however, that in arriving at this conclusion, the Court did not attempt to
discover the meaning of the text by examining the words of the text; rather,
meaning is discovered by reference to modern applications of those words
(and a somewhat strained interpretation of those applications). The only
textual analysis is a sleight of hand dismissal of the broad interpretation-
"we do not think the words must be given that meaning." But in so stating,
the Court seems to admit that the words could be given "that meaning."
In short, the Smith Court chose one plausible interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause over another plausible interpretation, without explaining
how the text of the clause supported the choice. When one couples this
somewhat cavalier treatment of text with the Court's less than credible
doctrinal circumlocutions, one can only conclude that the "correct inter-
pretation" of the Free Exercise Clause was the product of a policy judgment.
Indeed, the opinion says as much:
[I]f "compelling interest" really means what it says (and watering
it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is
applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting
such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases
in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs,
and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely
because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of
almost every conceivable religious preference," . . . and precisely
because we value and protect that religious divergence we cannot
afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to
the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not
protect an interest of the highest order.
45
The Court then describes a litany of laws that might be subjected to this
presumption of invalidity,4 suggesting that the judicial accommodation of
free exercise claims asserted against laws of general applicability would
prove unworkable in a civil society. This is not necessarily a bad policy
judgment; indeed, it has much to commend itself.4 7 Most importantly,
however, it demonstrates how policy and judgment, applied against the
backdrop of modern concerns, can be used to resolve a textual ambiguity.
Would that the author of Smith had simply said as much.
The RFRA was adopted as a response to Smith. It represents, in effect,
a congressional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. That interpreta-
tion roughly parallels the Broad/Broad interpretive combination under which
laws of general applicability are subject to the strictures of the clause. As
such, the RFRA is as textually defensible as is the decision in Smith. One
45. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
46. Id. at 889.
47. See Marshall, supra note 7; Tushnet, supra note 7.
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must then inquire into the policy judgment underlying the interpretive choice
made by the proponents of the RFRA. But before doing so, one interpretive
difficulty must be noted.
The RFRA does go beyond the Broad/Broad interpretation in one
important respect. Under the RFRA, government action that "substantially
burdens a person's exercise of religion" is forbidden in the absence of
compelling circumstances. This new language broadens the scope of the
proscription beyond any sensible interpretation of the word "prohibiting"
as that word is used in the context of the Bill of Rights. Prohibit becomes
synonymous with interfere and, as discussed earlier, the text does not provide
a convincing vehicle for conveying this meaning. A law that merely burdens
is not a law that prohibits. Neither the legislative history of the RFRA nor
the academic support for its passage provides any clue as to how the
"substantially burdens" language comports with the text of the Constitution.
Of course, the purpose of that language was to preserve and expand the
Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner, which, for many proponents of the
RFRA, provides more of a foundation for their free exercise jurisprudence
than does the language of the Free Exercise Clause. So to this extent, the
RFRA is textually indefensible.
Focusing on only the textually defensible aspect of the RFRA, namely,
the statute's reliance on the Broad/Broad interpretation, the best one can
say is that Congress relied on one plausible interpretation while the Court
relied on another. The text of the Free Exercise Clause, however, played
little or no part in the choice made by Congress, i.e., if one can call the
congressional decision a choice. The debate over the RFRA did not center
upon plausible choices and policy judgments. Rather, the purported need
for the RFRA was premised upon an apocalyptic vision of post-Smith
freedom of religion in America.48 The clear illegitimacy of Smith was
presumed; the policy judgment and the plausible interpretive choice at the
heart of Smith were ignored. Instead, a different policy concern, namely,
a belief that "[r]eligious liberty in this country is in very serious crises,"
49
drove the passage of the RFRA and its reliance upon a broadly conceived
definition of "prohibit."
Does the RFRA represent a valid interpretation of text? From the
perspective of our eighteenth century reader, the afnswer is partly yes and
partly no. Yes, as to prohibitory laws of general applicability that happen
to include religious activities within their proscription; no as to laws that
burden, but do not proscribe, religious activities.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
An alternative to both Smith and the RFRA would be premised on the
twin notions of restraint and patience, and upon the acceptance of ambiguity
48. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-67; 330-59 (1992)
(Prepared Statements of Nadine Strossen, President, ACLU, and Douglas Laycock, Professor
of Law, University of Texas).
49. Laycock, supra note 14, at 850.
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as a healthy part of constitutional law. If the constitutional text is both
relevant and ambiguous, the most sensible method to resolve that ambiguity
is by reference to concrete facts arising in specific cases. The ambiguity
would not always be resolved in favor of one alternative or the other.
Rather, choices would be made based upon relevant facts and good judgment
in light of current circumstances. Revision and rethinking would be the only
constant. Stated somewhat differently, given two plausible interpretations
of the constitutional text, it is both unnecessary and unwise to anoint one
alternative as the correct one. Usually both have something to offer. Better,
therefore, to permit both alternatives to remain part of a jurisprudence that
of necessity must remain flexible given the unknown contingencies to which
it will be applied. Which alternative is "correct" in any particular case will
depend on the facts and circumstances of that case.
The Smith Court, unfortunately, violated all these principles. It decided
broad-based and theoretical questions that were unnecessary to the decision
before it. Justice O'Connor's concurrence demonstrated as much. And it
created a rigid structure based upon a policy-driven "correct" interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause that purports to distinguish between religious-
specific laws and laws of general applicability. But the policy of one case
need not be the policy of another. A policy against insensitivity to less
familiar religions might lead to a different "correct" conclusion. Moreover,
the structure created by the Court resembles reality only at the obvious
endpoints. For example, the antipolygamy law at issue in Reynolds v. United
States0 was a law of general applicability, but may well have been driven
by religious-specific animosity. The compelling state interest test is certainly
one way to ferret out such animosity. Other techniques are available as
well.
The RFRA, although understandable as a reaction to Smith, stands on
no better ground. Its "correct" interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
is used to interpose a relatively rigid version of the compelling state interest
test between the government and all religious objectors who claim that a
law substantially burdens their religious practices. 5' What, by the way, is a
substantial burden? This broad sweep does trigger some of the concerns
suggested by the Smith Court, namely, the courting of anarchy in a
religiously diverse society. For example, to what extent will curriculum
decisions at public schools be subject to the compelling state interest test?
Realistically, some laws that invade religious practices require close scrutiny
and others do not, and the circumstances under which a court ought to be
suspicious of any particular government action cannot be defined in advance
by any particular test. The Court's decisions between Sherbert and Smith
50. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
51. Contrary to some assertions in the legislative history, the phrase "compelling state
interest" does not have any set legal definition. "Compelling under the circumstances" would
be a more apt phrasing. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (finding state's
interest in protecting local baitfish compelling).
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demonstrate the complex fabric of free exercise jurisprudence. Indeed, the
more recent decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,5 2 invalidating an animal sacrifice ordinance under the Free Exercise
Clause, indicates that Smith may not have been as broad-reaching as first
anticipated.
To sum up, two bad ideas do not make a good one. Neither Smith nor
the RFRA adequately addresses the significance of the constitutional text.
Nor does either of them reflect a realistic assessment of how law actually
functions and develops. But not to worry, efforts to establish acontextual
meaning are bound to fail. Over time both Smith and the RFRA will be
constructed away as text, fact, and policy collide in real cases.
52. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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